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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

POWELL V. STATE: WHEN THE TRIAL COURT RECORD
SUFFICIENTL Y DEMONSTRATES THAT A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED
HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, THE TRIAL JUDGE DOES
NOT NEED TO STATE ON THE RECORD THAT THE
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER IS VALID.
By: Christopher Heagy
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when the court record
demonstrates the trial court implicitly determined that a criminal
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial,
the trial judge need not state on the record that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Powell v.
Maryland, 394 Md. 632, 907 A.2d 242 (2006). In a consolidated
opinion, the Court held that Maryland Rule 4-246(b) does not compel
a trial judge to explicitly state that a defendant's waiver of his right to
a jury trial was knowingly and voluntarily given. Powell, 394 Md. at
643, 907 A.2d at 249.
On June 21, 2004, after a bench trial in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County, Tavony Wayne Zylanz ("Zylanz") was convicted
of fourth degree burglary, felony theft, resisting arrest and several
related offenses. Before Zylanz's bench trial began, his attorney told
him, in open court, that he could proceed with an agreed statement of
facts, have a jury trial, or have a bench trial. Zylanz asked questions
throughout this dialogue and received further explanations from his
attorney. Zylanz stated he understood his options and decided to have
a jury trial; however, prior to empanelling the jury, Zylanz told his
attorney he would like a bench trial. Defense counsel again stated
Zylanz's options on the record, after which, Zylanz agreed to have a
bench trial.
On December 4, 2003, after a bench trial in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, Steven Anthony Powell ("Powell"), was convicted of
second-degree murder. Before his trial began, Powell's attorney stated
that Powell had decided to waive his right to a jury trial and sought to
place Powell's waiver on the court record. On the court record,
170

2007]

Jury Trial Waivers

171

Powell's attorney explained Powell's options and asked Powell if he
understood those options. When asked if he wanted a bench or jury
trial, Powell chose a bench trial.
In separate opinions, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed both Zylanz's and Powell's convictions holding that both
Zylanz and Powell knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to a
jury trial in conformity with Maryland Rule 4-246(b). The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted Zylanz's petition for writ of certiorari to
determine whether he had validly waived his right to a jury trial absent
an explicit finding on the record that his waiver was knowingly and
voluntarily given. The Court granted Powell's petition for writ of
certiorari to consider the same issue and to consider whether Powell's
waiver was valid when there was no specific inquiry into the
voluntariness of his waiver. Although the petitions for writs of
certiorari were granted and the cases were argued separately before the
Court, because of the common central issue, both cases were
consolidated into one opinion.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by stating that
although both the United States and Maryland Constitutions protect a
defendant's right to a jury trial, a criminal defendant may waive that
right. Powell, 394 Md. at 638, 907 A.2d at 246. Maryland Rule 4246(b) states a criminal defendant may waive his right to a jury trial
before his trial begins, as long as the trial court determines, after the
defendant is examined on the record, that his waiver was knowingly
and voluntarily given. Powell, 394 Md. at 638-39, 907 A.2d at 246.
To waive a constitutionally protected right, "the trial judge must be
satisfied that there has been an intentional relinquishment, or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." [d. at 639, 907 A.2d at
246-47 (quoting Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379, 825 A.2d 1055,
1064 (2003)). Waiver depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case and the trial court must be satisfied that "the waiver is not a
product of duress or coercion and further that the defendant has some
knowledge of the jury trial right" before waiving that right. Powell,
394 Md. at 639,907 A.2d at 247 (quoting State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178,
182,582 A.2d 507,509 (1990)).
The Court then examined the requirements of Maryland Rule 4246(b) to determine whether the trial court must place its conclusion
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury
trial on the record. Powell, 394 Md. at 640, 907 A.2d at 247. Looking
at the plain language of Maryland Rule 4-246(b), the Court decided
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that while an examination of the defendant must be conducted on the
record, the language of the Rule does not require that the trial judge
explicitly state that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived
his right to a jury trial. Powell, 394 Md. at 641, 907 A.2d at 247.
In Zylanz's case, based on the totality of the circumstances,
including Zylanz's conversation with his attorney and his responses to
the trial judge's questions, the trial judge implicitly determined that
Zylanz's waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowingly and
voluntarily given. Id. at 643, 907 A.2d at 248-49. There is a
presumption that a trial judge knows and properly applies the law. Id.
at 643, 907 A.2d at 249. As such, the trial judge is not required to
make an explicit finding that the waiver of a jury trial is knowingly
and voluntarily made. Id. When the record reflects that the trial court
implicitly determined that the elements of a knowing and voluntary
waiver were present, Maryland Rule 4-246(b) is not violated and the
waiver is valid. Powell, 394 Md. at 643, 907 A.2d at 249. In the
instant case, the court record sufficiently demonstrated that Zylanz
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Id.
Similarly, based on the conversation between Powell and his attorney
on the record, the trial judge implicitly determined that Powell
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Id. at 64448, 907 A.2d at 249-50.
Finally, Powell argued further that Maryland Rule 4-246(b) was
violated when there was no specific inquiry into the voluntariness of
his jury trial waiver. Powell, 394 Md. at 645, 907 A.2d at 250. Trial
judges are not required, however, to engage in a "specific ritual to
assess the voluntariness of a defendant's jury trial waiver." Id.
Absent a factual trigger, which sparks an inquiry into the voluntariness
of the defendant's jury trial wavier, the trial judge need not explicitly
ask a defendant whether his waiver was coerced. /d. (citing Kang v.
State, 393 Md. 97, 899 A.2d 843 (2006». In this case, Powell's
responses to his attorney's questions on the record did not require the
trial judge to inquire further as to voluntariness of the waiver. Powell,
394 Md. at 645, 907 A.2d at 250.
Judge Greene's dissent argues that the majority's interpretation of
Maryland Rule 4-246(b) is inconsistent with the Court's interpretation.
of similarly written rules and that the majority incorrectly interprets
the rule because the plain meaning of "determine" requires the trial
judge to state on the record that the defe~dant's waiver was knowingly
and voluntarily given. Powell, 394 Md. at 648-52, 907 A.2d at 251-55
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(Greene, J. dissenting). Further, a clear statement by the trial judge on
the record regarding the defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial
would remove any reasonable doubt about the trial judge's finding and
does not impose a significant burden on the trial court. [d. at 652, 907
A.2d at 254 (Greene, J. dissenting).
In Powell v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
trial court can implicitly determine that a criminal defendant has
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Although
this decision appears to comply with Maryland Rule 4-246(b), the
Court seems to ignore the presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights. The waiver of a fundamental
constitutional right should require an explicit finding by the trial judge
that such a right was knowingly and voluntarily waived. A more indepth inquiry into the defendant's waiver of this right would protect
the defendant without imposing a significant burden on the trial court.

